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Using an improved definition and indicator of growth accelerations, we examine whether 
political regimes, regime changes, and economic reform are related to growth accelerations. 
Our results show that economic growth accelerations are preceded by economic reforms. 
Furthermore, we find that growth accelerations are more likely to happen after the start of a 
new political regime. 
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1. Introduction 
Various studies suggest that economic reform and the political regime in place are 
driving a country’s economic growth performance.
1 However, models testing these 
relationships have been criticized for their limited ability to address causality (e.g. 
Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005). Furthermore, cross-country growth regressions are 
based on very strong assumptions about a single linear model being appropriate for all 
countries in all states, while very few countries have experienced consistently constant 
growth rates over periods of several decades. Therefore, Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 
(2005) focus on so-called growth accelerations and examine which covariates are related 
to periods of rapid economic growth.
2 They find that growth accelerations are often 
preceded by political regime changes, while economic reform is hardly related to these 
accelerations.
3  
In this paper we re-examine the relationship between economic reform, political 
regime changes, and growth accelerations, making the following contributions. First, we 
improve upon the filter used by Hausmann et al. to identify growth accelerations as this 
filter yields some strange outcomes. For example, 27 episodes identified as accelerations 
have higher growth in the year before the acceleration than at the start of the acceleration. 
Second, we find that country fixed effects should not be neglected when examining 
growth accelerations. Therefore, we use conditional fixed effects logistic regressions as 
proposed by Chamberlain (1980) instead of (pooled) probit regressions. Third, we do not 
only focus on (the direction of) regime changes, but also examine the role of regime 
duration. Finally, we do not solely rely on the Polity IV dataset, but also investigate the 
robustness of our results using alternative regime indicators. 
  Our main findings are that that economic growth accelerations are preceded by 
economic reforms. Furthermore, we find that growth accelerations are more likely to 
happen after the start of a new political regime.  
                                                 
1 For a survey on the relationship between economic growth and political regimes see e.g. Przeworski, 
Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000). Winters (2004) provides an overview of the relationship between 
trade liberalization and economic growth, while the literature on economic reform and economic growth is 
surveyed by De Haan, Lundström and Sturm (2006).  
2 Related papers that organise the data around particular events to identify causal determinants of growth 
include  Jones and Olken (2005a, b). 
3 However, Jong-A-Pin and De Haan (2006) argue that these results are driven by an error in the dataset of 
Hausmann et al. and find that regime changes are not related to growth accelerations.   3
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our filter to identify economic 
growth accelerations. Section 3 analyzes the relationship between political regime 
changes, economic reform and growth accelerations, while section 4 examines the 
robustness of our results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Identifying growth accelerations 
For the period 1957-1992, Hausmann et al. (2005) identify no less than 83 periods of 
accelerated growth, using the following filter. For each country (with more than 1 million 
inhabitants and more than 20 available observations), the logarithm of real GDP per 
capita (taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2.) is regressed on time for every eight year 
period (n=7). That is, 
 
 
Where y denotes real GDP capita and t is time. The estimated parameter, gt,t+n , is taken as 
a proxy for the average growth rate over the period t to t+n  and labeled the “least squares 
growth rate”. To qualify as a growth acceleration, the least squares growth rate should be 
at least 3.5% per annum. Furthermore, it should be at least 2 percentage points higher 
than in the previous eight years. Finally, to rule out episodes of full economic recovery, 
the level of real GDP should be higher at the end of the acceleration than in all years 
before the acceleration. In cases that consecutive years qualify to be the start of a growth 
acceleration, the year is chosen with the highest F-statistic of a piecewise linear (or 
spline) regression with the break at the relevant year. Hausmann et al. allow for the 
possibility that an acceleration is followed by another acceleration as long as the second 
acceleration starts at least five years after the first one.  
Hausmann et al. (2005) provide several robustness checks to convince the reader 
that the chosen criteria are defensible. Still, we argue that these criteria can be improved 
upon. Table 1 reports the growth rate before the start of the growth accelerations 
identified by Hausmann et al, the growth rate in the first year of the acceleration and the 
eight year growth average according to data from the Penn World Tables 6.2. 
 
n i t g a y n t t i t , , 0 , * ) ln( , L = + + = + + ε  4
[Table 1 here] 
 
It follows that 18 growth acceleration episodes as identified by Hausmann et al. have a 
negative growth rate in the first year of the acceleration. Furthermore, 27 of the identified 
episodes have a higher growth rate in the year before the acceleration than at the start of 
the acceleration. Finally, in 10 episodes, growth in the year before the acceleration is 
higher than the average growth rate during the entire acceleration. On the basis of these 
figures it seems that episodes falling in the first category are identified too early, while 
episodes falling in the latter categories are identified too late.
4 
To identify the initiation of a growth acceleration adequately, we propose a simple 
criterion that first identifies all possible take-offs of an acceleration. This criterion is 
similar to the so-called BBQ rule used to identify turning points in business cycles 
(Harding and Pagan, 2002). To qualify as the start of an economic growth acceleration in 
year t, growth should be higher than in the year before
5: 
 
t t g g > +1  
 
If year t  fulfills this criterion, we check whether it also fulfills the three criteria of 
Hausmann et al. (2005): 




















If these are satisfied as well and year t-1 and year t+1 do not qualify, year t is the start of 
the growth acceleration. If consecutive years fulfill all criteria, we take the year in which 
the level of real GDP is minimal to be the starting point of the growth acceleration. This 
                                                 
4 In our opinion, the reason why the filter is unable to identify the start of the growth acceleration 
adequately is the use of the spline regression method. If one break is allowed in the fitted function, its 
optimal position is also affected by the volatility and other breaks in the series. As a consequence, the 
criterion of the highest F-statistic of the fitted function gives the best fitted line through the GDP series, but 
not necessarily the optimal location of the break. 
5 As a robustness check, we also examined the criterion that the two-year growth rate should exceed the 
two-year growth rate before the start of the growth acceleration. This alternative criterion ensures that the 
growth rate at the start of the acceleration is substantial.    5
simple rule ensures that the growth rate in the first year of an acceleration always 
increases relative to the previous year. Our filter identifies 84 accelerations, which are 
reported in Table 2.
6 
 
[Table 2 here]  
 
There are substantial differences between accelerations based on the filter of Hausmann 
et al. (2005) and those based on our filter. Only 28 episodes (33%) are identified at 
exactly the same date, 31 episodes (37%) differ one year, while 15 episodes (18%) are 
identified with more than one year difference. Furthermore, our filter does not pick up 9 
episodes, which are identified by the filter of Hausmann et al. as these episodes do not 
fulfill the condition that the growth rate at the first year of the acceleration should be 
larger than the growth rate in the year before the acceleration.
7 Finally, we identify 10 
episodes not found by Hausmann et al.. 
To illustrate the different results, Figure 1 shows the real GDP series of Chile, 
Botswana and Mali. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The figure indicates in which year the growth acceleration starts according to both 
approaches. It can be seen that in the case of Chile, the timing of the filter of Hausmann 
et al. is too late, while it is too early in the case of Botswana. The case of Mali illustrates 
that the acceleration identified by Hausmann et al. in fact lasts only 6 years. However, it 
is identified as an acceleration, because  the average growth rate in the last 6 years of the 
acceleration compensate for the negative growth rate in the first two years of the 
                                                 
6 We checked whether our episodes suffer from the same problem as dealt with in Table 1. In turns out that 
on two occasions our filter identifies an acceleration which is preceded by a year that has a higher growth 
rate than the average growth rate during the entire acceleration: Congo (1969) and Pakistan (1965). In the 
case of Congo, the actual growth acceleration started before the sample period, i.e. 1967. The situation of 
Pakistan is different as 1965 is the first possible start after the previous acceleration.    
7 These episodes are (starting year in parenthesis): Guinea-Bissau (1988), Haiti (1990), Malawi (1992), 
Mali (1972),  Papua New Guinea (1987),  Poland (1992), Syria (1974), Uganda (1977) and Uruguay 
(1989).   6
acceleration. As it is required that the acceleration has to be (at least) 8 years, our rule 
makes sure that these quasi growth accelerations are not identified. 
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
We examine which variables trigger the start of a growth acceleration. In particular, we 
are interested in the effect of economic reform and political regime changes. The 
dependent variable we employ in the analysis takes a value of one centered on the timing 
of the start of a growth acceleration and zero otherwise.
8 Our dataset consists of 106 
countries over the period 1957-1993 of which 57 countries experienced at least one 
growth acceleration. 
As a proxy for economic reform we rely on the index provided by Wacziarg and 
Welch (2003), that incorporates a number of structural features (e.g., presence of 
marketing boards and socialist economic regimes) and the macroeconomic environment 
(e.g., presence of a large black-market premium for foreign currency), in addition to tariff 
and non-tariff barriers to trade. Following Hausmann et al. (2005), the variable included 
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 during the first five years of a transition towards 
“openness”.  
Our regime change variable is taken from the Polity IV dataset of Marshall and 
Jaggers (2002). A regime change is defined as a three points change in the Polity score in 
three years or less. However, as it is possible that a country has no formal regime for a 
couple of years, we focus only on those changes, which are followed by a continuation of 
the same regime for at least one year. Like the economic reform dummy, we use a 
dummy equal to one for the first five years after a political regime change and zero 
otherwise. Following Hausmann et al. (2005), we differentiate between positive (i.e. 
changes towards more democracy) and negative regime changes (changes towards more 
autocracy). In addition, we add the durability of a regime defined as the number of years 
                                                 
8 We follow Hausmann et al. regarding the treatment of the dependent variable. That is, if an acceleration 
starts in year t then year t-1 and t+1 also are assigned the value one. As shown in the previous section, there 
is some uncertainty concerning the timing of a growth acceleration and following the approach of 
Hausmann et al. reduces the probability of missing the initiation of an acceleration. Furthermore, we omit 
those observations from the analysis which cannot be the start of the acceleration (years t+2 – t+5).     7
that the current regime is in place, following the suggestion of Clague, Keefer, Knack and 
Olson (1996).
9 
We test for the appropriate panel data model using the Hausman test (Hausman, 
1978). We test the null-hypothesis that all country fixed effects equal zero by comparing 
the estimates of a conditional fixed effects logit (CFEL) model (see Chamberlain, 1980) 
and the unrestricted (pooled) logit model. The null-hypothesis of no country specific 
effects is rejected for all model specifications. Hence, CFEL should be preferred. 
Furthermore, we examine the presence of time effects in the dataset. Figure 2 shows the 
average number of growth accelerations per year for the entire sample period. The pattern 
we roughly observe is that the number of growth accelerations is steadily decreasing over 
time. Therefore, we include a linear trend in our model, which turns out to be highly 
significant in all specifications. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
Table 3 contains the estimation results. The results reported in columns 1-4 are based on 
the full sample, while columns 5-8 excludes those episodes that started just after an 
economic crisis. As it seems likely that economic growth picks up after a crisis, we want 
to make sure that our results are not driven by the inclusion of this kind of ‘economic 
recovery’ accelerations. In case the growth rate in the two years before the growth 
acceleration is smaller than -10% we define it as a post-crises growth acceleration.
10 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
It can be immediately observed that the results for the two samples are very similar. In 
contrast to the results reported by Hausmann et al. (2005), we find that the effect of 
economic reform on the probability of a growth acceleration is highly significant in all 
specifications. However, the results for political regime changes are less clear. Political 
regime changes are in general not related to growth accelerations, but we do find a 
                                                 
9 The correlation coefficient between our regime change dummy and the durability indicator is -0.37.  
10 Using a threshold of -5% results in exactly the same result (14 post crisis growth accelerations). If a 
threshold of -15% is used, we find only 3 such episodes.   8
negative and significant effect of regime duration for all specifications. This implies that 
growth accelerations are more likely to happen after the start of a new political regime. 
Although the results seems to contradict each other, we think this can be explained by the 
fact that our regime change dummy only takes the value of one in the first five years after 
a regime change. It can therefore be concluded that for a growth acceleration to happen, it 
may take more than five years after a political regime change. 
If we differentiate between regime changes towards more democracy and changes 
towards more autocracy, we find that regime changes are only marginally related to the 
initiation of a growth acceleration. The point estimates, however, suggest that growth 
accelerations are more likely to happen in the first five year after a change towards more 
autocracy than a change towards more democracy.  
 
 
4. Robustness analysis 
To check the robustness of our results we run several variants of our base model. The 
results are reported in Table 4.
11 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
First, we replace the regime change variable for two alternative indicators. These 
alternative indicators are based on Prezworski et al. (2000) and Vanhanen (2000). We 
define a regime change if according to these authors the regime switches from democracy 
to autocracy and vice versa. According to both measures, a change to more autocracy 
significantly increases the probability of a growth acceleration. A change to more 
democracy is marginally related to growth accelerations according to the indicator of 
Vanhanen.  
Next, we examine the robustness of our results using a variant of our filter. 
Instead of the rule that in the first year of the acceleration the growth rate has to be higher 
than in the year before the acceleration, we now restrict the filter to identify those take-
                                                 
11 The results presented here are based on the sample including all episodes. We also checked whether the 
results differ if we exclude accelerations after an economic crisis. These results are very similar to the 
results presented here and are available on request.   9
offs in which the two-year growth rate is higher than the two-year growth rate before the 
start of the acceleration. Again, the results are very similar to those presented in the 
baseline model.  
Finally, we add several control variables to the baseline model. These variables 
are also used by Hausmann et al. (2005). In column 6 we incorporate terms of trade, 
whilst we add a dummy for financial liberalization in column 7. Unfortunately, the use of 
additional control variables decreases the sample size. It can be seen that adding the 
terms of trade variable or the financial liberalization measure affects the result for the 
economic reform variable, which becomes insignificant. This result is driven by the fact 
that a number of countries drop from the sample, which had an economic reform just 
before a growth acceleration.
12  
When we include variables that capture characteristics of the political 
environment such as the tenure and death of a political leader (following Jones and Olken 
(2005b)), or the presence (or end of) a civil war, we obtain the same results as in the 
baseline model.  
 
 
5. Concluding comments 
Due to the fixation on long-run differences in growth, empirical growth research has 
underestimated the importance of instability and volatility in growth rates, especially in 
developing countries. Traditional cross-country and panel growth models are not well 
suited to use information provided by the time dimension. Periods chosen in panel 
models are often justified only on the grounds that data were available at those 
frequencies or the researcher wanted to divide the whole period into equal chunks. These 
periods are unlikely to identify information provided by the development of variables 
over time. If, for instance, there is a high growth rate in the first five years and a low 
growth rate in the second half of the ten year period, the period average will be rather 
uninformative.  
                                                 
12 In fact, the four countries that drop from the sample if we include financial liberalisation all had an 
economic reform just before the start of the acceleration, i.e. Denmark, Tunisia, Taiwan and Uganda.   10
The approach suggested by Hausman et al. (2005) is much more promising to use 
the information provided by the time dimension. These authors focus on turning points in 
growth performance, examining instances of rapid acceleration in economic growth that 
are sustained. They identify more than 80 such episodes since the 1950s, finding that  
political-regime changes are statistically significant predictors of growth accelerations. 
Building upon the work by Hausman et al., we make various contributions. First, 
we improve upon the filter used by Hausmann et al. to identify growth accelerations as 
their filter yields some strange outcomes. Second, we test for country fixed effects and 
based on the testing outcomes use conditional fixed effects logistic regressions as 
proposed by Chamberlain (1980) instead of (pooled) probit regressions. Third, we do not 
only focus on (the direction of) regime changes, but also examine the role of regime 
duration. Finally, we investigate the robustness of our results using alternative regime 
indicators. 
  Our main findings differ from those of Hausmann et al. (2005). First, we find that 
economic growth accelerations are preceded by economic reforms. Furthermore, our 
results suggest the impact of political regimes changes is not robust, but that growth 
accelerations are more likely to happen after the start of a new political regime.   11
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Algeria 1975  1.6  10.7  4.2 n  n n 
Argentina 1963  -6.1  7.7  3.6  n  n  n 
Argentina 1990  -6.0  9.8  6.1  n  n  n 
Australia 1961  -1.7 4.8  3.8  n  n  n 
Belgium 1959  3.8 5.4 4.5  n  n  n 
Botswana 1969  5.1  -5.1  11.7  y  n  y 
Brazil 1967  2.5  8.4  7.8  n  n  n 
Canada 1962  5.1 3.4 3.6  y  y  n 
Chad 1973  -8.3  -4.6  7.3  n n  y 
Chile 1986  3.1  3.7  5.5  n n  n 
China 1978  -1.1  10.6  6.7  n  n  n 
China 1990  7.0  10.6  8.0  n  n  n 
Colombia 1967  0.8  2.9  4.0  n  n  n 
Comoros 1972  -2.8  0.6  5.3  n  n  n 
Congo Rep.   1969  9.0  12.2  5.4  n  y  n 
Congo Rep.   1978  7.9  13.7  8.2  n  n  n 
Denmark 1957  4.0  0.5  5.3  y  n  n 
Dominican Rep.  1969  5.4  13.3  5.5  n  n  n 
Dominican Rep.  1992  4.2  3.8  6.3  y  n  n 
Ecuador 1970  4.2 2.9 8.4  y  n  n 
Egypt 1976  10.3  9.8  4.7  y  y  n 
Finland 1958  -2.1  7.1  5.0 n  n  n 
Finland 1967  1.3  0.6  5.6 y  n  n 
Finland 1992  -7.8  -4.3  2.8 n  n  y 
Ghana 1965  -21.7  22.7  8.3 n  n n 
Guinea-Bissau 1969  -1.7  -27.8  8.1  y  n  y 
Guinea-Bissau 1988  -5.4  -1.6  5.2  n  n  y 
Haiti 1990  1.9  11.6  12.7  n  n  n 
India 1982  3.2  5.3  3.9  n n  n 
Indonesia 1967  -1.6  9.4  5.5  n  n  n 
Indonesia 1987  2.5  4.0  5.5  n  n  n 
Ireland 1958  0.0  4.8  3.7 n  n n 
Ireland 1985  2.5  -0.6  5.0 y  n y 
Israel 1957  3.6  3.2  5.3  y  n  n 
Israel 1967  -6.0  17.2  7.2  n n  n 
Japan 1958  3.4  8.4  9.0  n  n n 
Jordan 1973  -1.5  -1.7  9.1 y  n y 
Rep. Korea   1962  -0.4  8.9  6.9  n  n  n 
Rep. Korea  1984  7.2  5.3  8.0  y  n  n 
Lesotho 1971  3.4 -0.6 5.3  y  n  y 
Malawi 1970  -9.1  21.8  3.9 n  n n 
Malawi 1992  -10.3  12.8  4.8 n  n n 
Malaysia 1970  3.3  3.2  5.1  y  n  n 
Malaysia 1988  6.2  6.4  5.7  n  y  n   14
Mali 1972  2.8  -3.6  3.8  y  n  y 
Mauritius 1971  -0.5  4.4  6.7  n  n  n 
Mauritius 1983  -0.2  2.6  5.5  n  n  n 
Morocco 1958  5.4  1.3  7.7  y  n  n 
New Zealand  1957  3.4  -1.3  3.8  y  n  y 
Nicaragua 1960  6.3  3.6  4.8  y  y  n 
Nigeria 1957  -0.6  4.2  4.3 n  n  n 
Nigeria 1967  -17.8  -3.2  7.3 n  n  y 
Norway 1991  2.5  2.5  3.7 n  n  n 
Pakistan 1962  1.7  4.0  4.8  n  n  n 
Pakistan 1979  -1.7 7.3  4.6  n  n  n 
Panama 1959  -0.7 9.7 5.4  n  n  n 
Panama 1975  1.2 -0.6 5.3  y  n  y 
Papua New 
Guinea  1987 0.0  -4.1  4.0  y  n  y 
Paraguay 1974  3.9  4.3  6.2  n  n  n 
Peru 1959  -6.0  10.6  5.2  n n  n 
Poland 1992  1.9  3.5  5.0 n  n n 
Portugal 1985  2.7 4.3 5.4  n  n  n 
Romania 1979  6.5  -2.1 12.4  y  n  y 
Rwanda 1975  -2.1  15.1  4.0  n  n  n 
Singapore 1969  12.5  12.3  8.2  y  y  n 
Spain 1959  -4.5  8.2  8.0  n  n  n 
Spain 1984  0.7  1.0  3.8  n  n  n 
Sri Lanka  1979  0.5  1.1  4.1  n  n  n 
Syria 1969  11.4  -19.2  5.8  y y  y 
Syria 1974  5.2  17.1  4.8  n y  n 
Syria 1989  -10.0  6.3  4.4  n n  n 
Taiwan 1961  4.0  4.6  7.1 n  n  n 
Thailand 1957  10.9 -0.6 5.3  y  y  y 
Thailand 1986  3.0  7.2  8.1  n  n  n 
Trinidad 
&Tobago 1975  1.4  8.5  5.4  n  n  n 
Tunisia 1968  9.7  4.7  6.6 y  y  n 
Uganda 1977  -0.8  -6.3  4.0  y  n  y 
Uganda 1989  1.3 5.2 3.6  n  n  n 
United Kingdom  1982  2.4  3.8  3.5  n  n  n 
United States  1961  0.4  4.7  3.9  n  n  n 
Uruguay 1974  1.8 5.0 4.0  n  n  n 
Uruguay 1989  0.1 -0.9 3.8  y  n  y 
Zimbabwe 1964  5.6  10.1  7.2  n  n  n 
Notes: column (1) indicates the start of the acceleration; column (2) shows the rate of growth in 
the year preceding the acceleration; column (3) contains the growth rate at the start of the 
acceleration; column (4) presents the average growth rate during the episode; column (5) 
indicates whether the growth before the start of the acceleration exceeds  the growth rate at the 
start of the episode (y = yes; n = no); column (6) indicates whether the growth before the start of 
the acceleration exceeds the average growth rate of the episode; and column (7) shows whether 
there is a negative growth rate at the start of the episode.    15














Difference in years 
with HPR 
Algeria 1975  2.1  4.2  2.1  0 
Argentina 1963  0.9  3.6  2.7  0 
Argentina 1990  -3.1  6.1  9.2  0 
Australia 1961  1.5  3.8  2.3  0 
Belgium 1958  2.4  4.7  2.3  1 
Botswana 1970  3.3  11.4  8.1  1 
Brazil 1966  3.1  7.2  4.1  1 
Cameroon 1972  -0.6  5.3  5.9  0 
Canada 1961  1.0  3.8  2.8  1 
Chad 1974  -1.5  7.3  8.8  1 
Chile 1983  1.7  4.2  2.5  3 
Chile 1988  1.0  5.8  4.8  ni5 
China 1976  2.0  5.3  3.4 2 
China 1981  3.5  6.5  3.0  ni5 
China 1989  5.2  8.7  3.5 1 
Colombia 1967  1.6  4.0  2.4  0 
Congo Rep.  1969  0.9  5.4  4.5  0 
Congo Rep.  1977  3.8  8.7  4.9  1 
Denmark 1958  2.2  5.2  3.0  1 
Dominican Rep.  1968  -0.2  6.5  6.6  1 
Dominican Rep.  1991  0.4  5.8  5.3  1 
Ecuador 1966  1.3  4.6  3.3  4 
Ecuador 1971  1.6  7.7  6.1  ni5 
Egypt 1975  -1.1  5.5  6.7 1 
Finland 1958  2.7  5.0  2.2  0 
Finland 1968  2.8  5.3  2.4  1 
Finland 1993  -0.4  4.4  4.8  1 
Ghana 1965  -0.1  8.3  8.4  0 
Guinea-Bissau 1971  -5.5 10.0  15.4  2 
India 1982  1.5  3.9  2.4  0 
Indonesia 1967  -0.8  5.5  6.2  0 
Indonesia 1987  3.4  5.5  2.1  0 
Ireland 1957  1.5  3.8  2.4  1 
Ireland 1986  1.5  4.9  3.5  1 
Ireland 1993  4.9  8.2  3.2  ni93 
Israel 1958  2.4  5.4  2.9  1 
Israel 1967  2.8  7.2  4.4  0 
Japan 1958  5.8  9.0  3.2 0 
Jordan 1971  -3.1  6.0  9.1  2 
Rep. Korea  1960  1.9  4.9  3.0  2 
Rep. Korea  1965  2.6  7.4  4.8  ni5 
Rep. Korea  1981  5.5  7.8  2.3  3 
Lesotho 1969  1.7  3.9  2.2  2 
Malawi 1970  1.5  3.9  2.5  0 
Malaysia 1971  3.0  5.0  2.1  1 
Malaysia 1986  2.3  5.5  3.2  2   16
Mali 1993  0.2  3.7  3.6  ni93 
Mauritius 1969  -1.5  4.7  6.2  2 
Mauritius 1983  1.0  5.5  4.4  0 
Morocco 1957  -0.9  7.8  8.7  1 
New Zealand  1958  2.1  4.1  2.0  1 
Nicaragua 1959  1.1  5.2  4.1  1 
Nigeria 1957  1.2  4.3  3.0  0 
Nigeria 1968  -3.4  4.6  8.0  1 
Norway 1991  1.4  3.6  2.2  0 
Pakistan 1960  -1.8  4.3  6.0  2 
Pakistan 1965  0.7  3.5  2.9  ni5 
Pakistan 1977  1.6  4.4  2.7  2 
Panama 1959  1.5  5.4  3.9  0 
Panama 1976  1.9  5.3  3.4  1 
Paraguay 1973  2.6  5.9  3.3  1 
Peru 1959  0.8  5.2  4.4  0 
Portugal 1984  1.6  5.6  4.0  1 
Romania 1980  0.6  14.5  13.8  1 
Rwanda 1975  0.7  4.0  3.3  0 
Singapore 1967  7.0  10.6  3.6  2 
Spain 1959  4.4  8.0  3.5 0 
Spain 1984  0.1  3.8  3.7 0 
Sri Lanka  1979  1.9  4.1  2.2  0 
Syria 1970  -0.3  5.2  5.5  1 
Syria 1989  -2.9  4.4  7.3  0 
Taiwan 1960  3.3  6.8  3.4  1 
Taiwan 1966  6.1  8.6  2.5 ni5 
Thailand 1958  -0.9  5.4  6.3  1 
Thailand 1983  4.3  6.6  2.3  3 
Trinidad &Tobago  1971  2.1  4.8  2.7  4 
Tunisia 1969  2.5  6.4  3.8  1 
Tunisia 1993  1.6  3.7  2.1 ni93 
Uganda 1989  -0.8  3.6  4.4  0 
United Kingdom  1982  1.1  3.5  2.5  0 
United States  1961  0.9  3.9  3.0  1 
Uruguay 1974  1.5  4.0  2.6  0 
Zimbabwe 1963  0.2  6.6  6.4  1 
Zimbabwe 1968  3.5  6.5  3.0  ni5 
Notes: column (1) indicates the start of the acceleration; column (2) shows the rate of growth in 
the 8 years preceding the acceleration; column (3) presents the average growth rate during the 
episode; column (4) presents the difference between column (2) and (3); and column (5) shows 
the differences between our filter and that of Hausmann et al. (2005). Ni5 denotes that the fact 
that we identify this acceleration, whilst Hausmann et al. (2005) do not identify this acceleration. 
This is due to a timing difference of the first acceleration and the possibility of an acceleration 
from the 5
th year onwards after the first acceleration. Ni93 denotes accelerations starting in 1993. 
These are not included by Hausmann et al. (2005). 
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Table 3. Estimation results: baseline model 
Dependent variable: timing of a growth acceleration   all episodes        post crises periods excluded 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Trend  -0.066 -0.052 -0.056 -0.062 -0.067 -0.049 -0.051 -0.063 
  (7.72)*** (5.41)*** (6.08)*** (7.14)*** (7.25)*** (4.67)*** (5.12)*** (6.65)***
Economic Reform  0.811 0.724 0.752 0.803 1.061 0.967 0.982 1.052 
  (2.85)*** (2.53)** (2.66)*** (2.82)*** (3.47)*** (3.15)*** (3.22)*** (3.44)***
Regime change  -0.117  -0.491     0.255  -0.257    
  (0.47)  (1.82)*    (0.96)  (0.89)    
Regime duration   -0.037  -0.027    -0.048  -0.042  
   (3.08)*** (2.53)**    (3.55)*** (3.59)***  
Positive regime change       -0.645      -0.248 
      (1.92)*      (0.72) 
Negative regime change      0.398      0.824 
      (1.30)      (2.45)**
Pseudo R-squared  0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 
Observations  1235 1235 1238 1235 1059 1059 1061 1059 
Countries  46 46 46 46 40 40 40 40 
Hausman test, prob>Chi^2  0.0028 0.0002 0.0039 0.0067 0.0129 0.0001 0.0001 0.0097 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses                 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%               
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Table 4. Sensitivity analysis 
Dependent variable: timing of a growth 
acceleration 
Regime changes 
according to Vanhanen  
Regime changes according 
to Przworski et al.   2year filter 
  
Various control variables added    
   (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) 
Trend  -0.054 -0.049 -0.053  -0.049  -0.036  0.012  -0.036  -0.032  -0.039 
  (5.64)*** (5.01)*** (5.44)***  (4.98)***  (3.47)***  (0.65)  (2.94)*** (2.80)***  (3.45)*** 
Economic reform  0.726 0.717 0.589  0.536  0.356  0.101  0.434  0.687  0.725 
  (2.56)** (2.52)** (1.99)**  (1.81)*  (1.12)  (0.25)  (1.29)  (2.13)**  (2.26)** 
Regime change  0.064   0.241             
  (0.23)   (0.86)             
DURABLE  -0.028 -0.031 -0.026  -0.029 -0.044  -0.053  -0.056 -0.057  -0.050 
  (2.58)*** (2.80)*** (2.27)**  (2.47)**  (3.54)***  (2.60)*** (4.09)*** (4.24)***  (3.79)*** 
Positive regime change   -0.763    -0.205  -1.234  -1.879 -1.958 -1.796  -1.784 
   (1.91)*    (0.56)  (3.45)***  (3.39)*** (4.03)*** (4.10)***  (4.04)*** 
Negative regime change   0.727    0.682  0.195  0.226  -0.008  -0.052  -0.047 
   (2.26)**    (1.99)**  (0.64)  (0.52) (0.02) (0.16)  (0.14) 
Terms of trade          0.014       
          (0.03)       
Civil war                1.092 
                ( 1 . 9 2 ) *  
End of war                - 0 . 3 4 1  
                ( 0 . 9 8 )  
Leader death              -0.267   
              ( 0 . 4 4 )    
Tenure death              -0.097   
              ( 1 . 2 9 )    
Financial liberalization            0.588     
            (1.24)     
Observations  1215 1215 1208  1208  1239  559  1035  1121  1121 
Countries  45 45 45  45  46  29  42  42  42 
Pseudo R-squared  0.08 0.10 0.08  0.08  0.09  0.05  0.11  0.12  0.11 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     19
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Note: the figure shows the number of growth accelerations per year. 
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